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The Dutch Golden Age and Globalization:  
History and Heritage, Legacies and Contestations 
 
Joop de Jong  
 
I. Context 
In 1579, seven of the seventeen Provinces of the Netherlands unenthusiastically declared 
their independence from the Habsburg King of Spain, to form the United Provinces, also 
known as the Union or the Dutch Republic. The new country achieved full international 
recognition in 1648, even though many states recognized its sovereignty much earlier. 
   The Dutch Republic was small in both size and population. It covered more or less the 
same territory as the present Dutch state, and had approximately 1.5 million inhabitants 
in 1600, and about 1.9 million by 1700.1 In 1600, France had 18 million inhabitants, 
Spain (including Portugal) 11 million, and Great Britain 7 million.2 The province of 
Holland contributed some 45 percent of the country’s total population. 
   Two most striking demographic features of the Dutch Republic were its high 
population density and in particular its early and high level of urbanization, especially in 
Holland and Zeeland. In the early sixteenth century as much as forty percent of the 
population in these provinces was already living in cities. By the middle of the 
seventeenth century, the twenty or so major cities in Holland were home to some sixty 
percent of the total population of this province, while nearly half of all residents of 
Zeeland lived in towns. The large number of towns and high degree of urbanization were 
unique in Europe. As such, the Dutch Republic can justifiably be labeled a “city-rich” 
society. If Amsterdam was by far the biggest city, albeit more so in the late seventeenth 
century than in the early decades of the Golden Age, many other Dutch cities equally rose 
to greater prominence in this era. Another interesting demographic feature of the Dutch 
Republic was the large number of residents who had their roots outside the seven 
provinces, an issue I will return to below. 
   The Dutch Republic adopted a rather atypical form of government. It was neither a city-
state like Venice, nor a modern (equating modern with centralization) territorial state, 
such as France. Instead, the seven United Provinces constituted a confederation without a 
strong central authority and in which the nobility was less prominent than other elites. 
The rather loose federation of sovereign provinces operated through changing coalitions 
of provinces, cities, regents, and the stadtholder, each having slightly different ideals and 
interests. In many respects, the Union still retained the character of a league of city-states 
or city-regions.3 It was “strikingly local in its economic and political organization.”4 The 
particular political structure of the Republic as a whole and of the individual provinces 
gave the cities a great degree of autonomy. 
   Above all, the Republic was a state of cities, governed by collectives of (self) elected 
members of the urban elites. The city government normally consisted of a council of 
elders and magistracy. The twenty to forty councilors were appointed for life and were 
selected, usually by the councils themselves, from “the wisest, most respectable and 
richest citizens.” These “city fathers,” or “wise men,” were considered to represent the 
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local citizens and to advise and supervise the magistracy. This magistracy consisted of 
two to four burgomasters, the magistrates or aldermen, and the sheriff. As a rule, the 
burgomasters and most aldermen were annually recruited from the council and continued 
to be members of that body. The members of both the council and magistracy were 
known as regents (regenten). 
   Foreign authors in particular have frequently used the term “middle class” in order to 
describe the regents’ social background. Compared to the aristocratic, often noble power 
elites elsewhere in Europe, this seems accurate. Socio-economic and political power in 
the Republic was based primarily on trade and industry, rather than landownership. To 
most other seventeenth-century elites in Europe, landownership was far more important. 
The Dutch regents regarded themselves as an elite within the citizenry, and they were 
also seen as such by most citizens. It should be added, however, that the “middle class” 
or “bourgeoisie” (burgerij) was not a homogeneous group either. Its upper echelons 
claimed a distinct status, enjoying a lifestyle that set them apart from its lower segments. 
Although upward social mobility was certainly possible at the time of the Republic, the 
boundaries between ruling elite and burgerij, as well as between burgerij and the 
“crowd,” were real and far from easy to cross. 
   The political structure and the multitude of individual interests required a considerable 
willingness to compromise, and a sense of balance on the part of the local elites. This 
often resulted in policies that had a strong local basis and that also presumed a relatively 
high level of mutual trust between local citizens and governments, as well as among the 
local population.5 
   Aside from well-known classical virtues (such as moderation, harmony, truthfulness, 
sincerity, perseverance, prudence, and vigilance) and traditional Northwestern-European 
values (such as incorruptibility and wisdom of judges, equality of all persons under the 
law, and the importance of statute law), the main political values during the Dutch 
Republic centered on securing peace and harmony, consultation and persuasion rather 
than conflict, obedience and compulsion, and moderate and gentle government. Civic 
authority was made, not born. Foreign observers were struck by the widespread sense of 
civic pride, as reflected in the attention to public buildings and by the extent to which city 
governments took local public opinion into account.6 Local authorities at least listened to 
their citizens—to the populus, not to the plebs. For all these various yet interrelated 
reasons, the United Provinces have been nicknamed the “Republic of Persuasion.” 
   Political tensions and open conflicts within towns, between towns and provinces, 
between stadtholder and regenten, and especially conflicts and war with other states were 
generally seen as undesirable because they would threaten peace, prosperity, and the 
status quo. This attitude can be accounted for in part by the small size of the Republic and 
its economic vulnerability in times of war. But specific cultural values play a role as well. 
Unlike many French or German noblemen, most Dutch local leaders were not looking for 
personal glory on the battlefield. They valued other activities much more. At the time of 
the Republic, one would rarely see paintings of battle scenes in Dutch private homes or 
public buildings such as town halls, whereas such representations were quite a common 
sight in nearby countries.7 
   Most Dutch regents let their political decisions be guided mainly by local and regional 
commercial or economic interests. Generally, they were more concerned with protecting 
favorable economic conditions and economic networks than with territory and territorial 
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expansion. Elsewhere in seventeenth-century Europe, by contrast, the political-military 
raison d’état, or the private interests of kings and emperors, would often prevail. 
   Within the provinces and towns of the Republic, the medieval citizenship system 
largely remained in place, as was true of the medieval walls and gates. Being a citizen, or 
poorter, was a prerequisite for holding political office, getting a job as a local civil 
servant, receiving charity, or gaining access to one of the guilds. Guilds were fraternities 
of professionals in a particular trade, and dated back to the Middle Ages. These various 
rules and traditions implied that professional life was virtually impossible for non-
citizens. Citizenship was a valuable privilege protecting the local “haves” against the 
“have-nots.” It safeguarded the local population against unwanted competition from 
outsiders and foreigners. But local citizens had to perform particular duties as well. For 
instance, they had to serve in the civic militia (schutterij). 
   Furthermore, each town had a special register in which the names of all new citizens 
were recorded. To become a citizen, a person or his parents had to be born in the city, or 
this formal status had to be acquired through marriage, purchase, or a gift from the town 
government. In case citizenship was bought and not inherited, the new citizen had to take 
an oath and wait a certain period of time before being able to enjoy all rights. It was 
impossible to become a citizen for poor migrants and—in many cities—for members of 
some religious minorities, such as the Jews.8 
   This implies that not all city residents were also citizens. After economic and social 
conditions started to deteriorate in many Dutch cities during the second half of the 
seventeenth century, local governments made it increasingly difficult to obtain 
citizenship, thus hoping to reduce the numbers of the poor and unemployed in their city. 
These various rules and policies underscore that in the local world of the Dutch Golden 
Age cities, local governments gave priority to the interests of their own citizens. 
   The Dutch Golden Age has been internationally admired and acclaimed for its 
impressive economic performance and its role in developing a world-economy. Peter 
Taylor has argued that in so-called world-systems analysis, the Dutch Republic is usually 
identified:  
 
...as one of the three hegemonic states that have defined the basis 
trajectory of the modern world-system. However compared with the 
British in the nineteenth century and the US in the twentieth century, the 
seventeenth century Dutch appear to be a pale shadow of what a ‘world 
hegemon’ should be. A very small state both territorially and 
demographically, it hardly seems feasible that this still new polity could 
set the path along which the modern world-system embarked to eliminate 
all rival systems…because it is not overt power that defines a hegemon but 
its infra-structural power: the Dutch developed a social formula, which we 
have come to call modern capitalism, that proved to be transferable and 
ultimately deadly to all other social formulas.9 
 
   Likewise, the Dutch Republic plays an important role in Immanuel Wallerstein’s 
famous books on the origins and the consolidation of the modern world-system. 
Wallerstein argues that the special novelty of the capitalist modern world-system 
(including the secret of its strength and success—it has been around for five centuries 
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already) is that it remained predominantly one economic system incorporating or 
accommodating many different political systems.10 The earlier world-systems had been 
very unstable structures, which all tended to change into political empires or disintegrate. 
For Wallerstein, capitalism is based on the (presumed) fact that economic factors are 
stronger than what any political system can achieve or control, which gives capitalists 
structural freedom to act. 
   The renowned French historian, Fernand Braudel, agrees with Wallerstein that during 
their Golden Age, the Dutch created a new, enlarged European world-economy; one that 
is Transatlantic in Wallerstein’s view and worldwide in that of Braudel.11 However, 
Braudel’s world economy (l’économie monde) should not be confused with what he 
called l’économie mondiale, which refers to the fact of covering the whole world. 
   Another relevant difference between Braudel’s and Wallerstein’s analysis of the 
emerging world-economy concerns the role of cities. Wallerstein tends to focus on states 
and national economies (preferring to incorporate the latter into a world-economy), while 
partially overlooking the fundamental role of cities in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. Individual cities do play a role in his analysis, but in general just the few most 
influential cities like Seville or Amsterdam. In contrast, towns and the mutual 
relationships among cities are central to Braudel. His concept of a world-economy is city-
centered (i.e., a network of centers of capital circulation). Similarly, I would argue that 
cities and city-economies, rather than states or national economies, were the dominant 
economic forces in the long sixteenth century. The creative agents of economic change 
often congregated in cities like Amsterdam; they served as “information exchanges” for 
the city network, which was at the center of the world-economy. Almost all information 
exchanges went through the predominantly informal networks of families and firms. 
Reliable personal networks were essential for local and regional trade—the bulk of all 
Dutch trade—as well as for long-distance and overseas trading, just as for almost all 
other economic, social, cultural, and political activities. 
   For both Braudel and Wallerstein the creation of a world economy was the logical 
result of the forceful and nonstop expansion of capitalist Europe after the fifteenth 
century. Europeans penetrated into other economic systems, subjugating the “periphery” 
to their own capitalist interests. In this sense, however, the Dutch did not create a true 
world economic system, according to P. W. Klein and others.12 Also in the sense of 
“making an impression on the continental, mainly rural subsistence economies of the 
peoples of East and Southeast Asia,” and on Asian maritime commerce and shipping, the 
seventeenth-century intervention of the Dutch and other Europeans was rather minimal 
and barely powerful enough to claim that European capitalists subjected Asia into their 
modern world system.13 
   Is Wallerstein’s picture of the Dutch Republic’s capitalist economy and its influence on 
the world too modern? According to Maarten Prak, Jan de Vries, and others, the economy 
of the Netherlands during its Golden Age certainly showed modern characteristics, 
including technological innovations.14 Specifically, these authors identified market 
economy expansion; urbanization resulting in more specialized, commercial, efficient, 
and often large-scale agricultural production; migration from the countryside to the 
growing towns; a dynamic labor market; and a sharp increase in the numbers of hired 
laborers. Some of these characteristics can be seen as capitalist in Schumpeter’s 
definition of capitalism (for instance, the introduction of new products, new production 
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techniques, creation of new markets, use of new raw materials, and improvement of the 
organization of production).15 In the view of John Merriman, however, organizational 
change in manufacturing was far more important than technological innovation for 
growth in the seventeenth century.16 
   Although the Netherlands was economically advanced, the Dutch were not the only 
ones to modernize their economy; it also happened in other parts of Europe. Furthermore, 
economic modernization was not exclusive to the seventeenth century, but actually 
started in the late Middle Ages. Most Dutch economic historians caution against 
interpreting everything in the Republic as “modern,” let alone “capitalist,” as well as 
against too “modern” definitions of modern and capitalist. In fact, in many aspects the 
Dutch economy of the Golden Age was neither modern nor capitalist. Prak has 
mentioned, for example, the absence of self-sustained continuous growth and of the 
continuous and substantial increase of per capita income.17 In fact, if we absolutely want 
to apply the word “capitalism” to the Dutch Golden Age, we should qualify it as “trade 
capitalism” (as different from nineteenth- and twentieth-century industrial capitalism), 
marked by slow and gradual innovations in trade. 
   In his classic and groundbreaking study of early modern entrepreneurship, P. W. Klein 
has clearly demonstrated that many seventeenth-century merchants and entrepreneurs 
preferred low or medium risk (securing a low or moderate income) over the combination 
of high risk and high profits.18 Because the pre-industrial world was already full of 
hazards, deliberately taking large economic risks in order to maximize profits amounted 
to a dangerous economic policy. In the short or even long run, it could easily lead to 
financial disaster, meaning personal and social tragedy. Entrepreneurial risks were 
considered by many a necessary evil to acquire or maintain family wealth, power, and 
prestige. The majority of Dutch Golden Age “capitalists” turned to safer and more secure 
investments (in land and obligations), and many of them reduced their risk-taking as soon 
as they had earned “enough.” The notorious (mercantilist) striving for trade monopolies 
was aimed not solely at maximizing profits, but perhaps even more at reducing risks. 
Acquiring capital was not an end in itself, but rather a means to the ends cited above. 
   Even though the Republic was “ruled by merchants,” as contemporaries claimed (and 
often deplored), the Dutch political elites were geared to trade, not necessarily or 
principally to “free trade” as defined by Adam Smith. Every town or province tried to 
protect its own interests by regulating and often restricting trade. Free (international) 
trade was favored by the Dutch if and when it best served the interests of the majority of 
their towns and provinces. Elaborate and detailed rules and regulations controlled 
production and trade. Moreover, the guilds were not abolished, which allowed the strict 
organization of manufacturing and distribution—with its virtual exclusion of all non-
locals from practicing a trade—to persist. 
   A last point of criticism is related to Wallerstein’s description and interpretation of the 
diverse groups of seventeenth-century Dutch citizens with their strong local and regional 
orientation, as a bourgeoisie, with a class consciousness and self-perception as a universal 
class recruiting its members from all social layers and developing a sense of national 
sentiment. This view should also be modified for being too modern, a point made by 
Simon Schama as well. The Dutch burger, or citizen, was not a proto-capitalist or 
primarily a homo economicus, nor does bourgeoisie (loaded at it is with nineteenth-
century assumptions) fully coincide with burgerij.19 
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   The Dutch were not the first Europeans to explore the possibilities of direct trade with 
other continents. The first explorers, traders, and colonists were predominantly late-
medieval Spanish and Portuguese. Spanish ships had reached the Americas in 1492 and 
six years later Portuguese ships made a financially extremely successful first trip to India. 
The return cargo of spices paid for the costs of the expedition sixty times over.20 Since 
the early sixteenth century, small flows of people, goods, and money have connected 
Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas in an exchange system dominated by Europeans. 
During the second half of the sixteenth century and into the seventeenth century, the 
commercial center of Europe (including its overseas trade with Asia, Africa, and the 
Americas) and its manufacturing center shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 
northwestern rim of Europe.21 
   According to Prak, the Dutch gave a new impetus to the development of 
intercontinental trade through their ability to integrate the various commercial flows due 
to their shipping capacity and nautical knowledge.22 Just before the middle of the 
seventeenth century, the 2,500 Dutch ships accounted for about half of Europe’s 
shipping.23 For a considerable part of the seventeenth century, the Northern Netherlands 
and in particular the city of Amsterdam functioned as the main hub, as the central or 
staple market of Europe’s overseas trade. During the first half of the eighteenth century, it 
would lose its position as preeminent trading and banking center to London. 
   It is illustrative here to give a short overview of the impressive rise of Dutch overseas 
trade outside of Europe.24 In the 1590s, Dutch ships became regular visitors to the 
African coast, buying sugar and precious metals from the Portuguese. In 1593–94, direct 
trade links with the Caribbean islands were established. In 1594, for the first time, a 
Dutch ship arrived in the port of Aleppo (present Syria), trading silver for spices and silk. 
That same year, the first of three consecutive expeditions was mounted by a consortium 
of merchants and investors to find a northern sea route to India. In 1595, four ships left 
for the East taking the southern route, circumnavigating Africa. Two years later only one 
ship returned, but this was enough  encouragement to send another 61 ships to the East 
between 1598 and 1602. Then the United East India Company (VOC), one of the first 
joint-stock companies, was founded in 1602 and granted a monopoly on trade with the 
East Indies. During the same period, the Portuguese, who had set up a trading network in 
Asia almost a century before, could send no more than 46 ships. In 1596, the Dutch built 
a fortress at the coast of present-day Guyana, its first stronghold in Africa. 
   Next, in 1609, Henry Hudson set foot on Manhattan Island, which from then on would 
be systematically colonized by merchants from Amsterdam. Half a century later, in 1664, 
almost 7,000 Europeans lived in the colony of New Netherland, approximately 2,500 in 
New Amsterdam, about 1,000 in Albany, and the rest in some twenty small rural 
settlements.25 
   As a counterpart to the VOC, the smaller and less successful West India Company 
(WIC) was founded in 1621, receiving from the States-General the monopoly on trade 
with Africa and southern America. The main pursuit of the WIC was sugar, and sugar 
meant growing sugarcane on plantations. In 1629, the company fought a costly war with 
the Portuguese in Brazil, with its many sugar plantations. Already by 1654 the WIC had 
to give up Brazil. The colony had not brought the projected earnings, just as the slave 
trade with Brazil proved to turn hardly any profit. In 1634, several of the Antillean 
islands were conquered. In 1664, New Netherland surrendered upon the arrival of a huge 
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British fleet. Ten years later, the Republic officially accepted the loss of New Netherland 
in exchange for recognition of the Dutch claim to Surinam, which colonizers from the 
province of Zeeland had taken by force in 1667. Surinam and its plantations (initially 
owned and exploited by a private company) became the main Dutch colony in the West, 
although the island of Curacao developed into the main slave trading station. The 
possession of Surinam and the small Antillean islands was the only lasting result of the 
colonization efforts of the WIC, a company that was almost permanently on the verge of 
bankruptcy. 
   Between the two companies another interesting and important difference existed, due to 
the different economic and political situation in Asia and in the Americas. The VOC set 
up trading posts in Asia to purchase the desired goods, and in general it opposed 
colonization. Structural settlement was a means to an end for this trading company, 
although the VOC did lay the foundation of what was to become much later (in the 
nineteenth century) one of the biggest colonial empires. The WIC was much more in 
favor of, and dependent on, establishing colonies in America in order to produce the 
necessary goods, which were not produced sufficiently by the indigenous populations. 
This explains the different demographic imprint of the two companies and the greater 
profitability of the VOC. Another difference pertains to the prevailing attitude toward the 
non-Europeans. In Asia the employees of the VOC often had to beg, bribe, intrigue, or 
pay in order to receive the goods and services of the native peoples. The use of force and 
violence was virtually unthinkable in the relations with Japan, China, and other well-
organized states in the East. Yet such force marked the behavior toward the “wild,” 
“primitive,” and “uncivilized” natives of Africa and the Americas in arduous colonization 
attempts. 
   Between 1602, the year in which the VOC was founded, and 1700, a total of 324,000 
persons, many of them Germans and Scandinavians and other non-Dutch, left for the East 
on company ships (on average 20 to 25 ships per year).26 Of this number, 113,000 of 
them eventually returned. The figures for the eighteenth century are even more 
impressive: 671,000 traveled to the East, of whom 266,000 returned. The VOC was a 
huge company for its time, employing nearly 12,000 Europeans in Asia at the end of the 
seventeenth century. But even 12,000 is an extremely small number compared to the size 
of the Asian populations. The two biggest VOC outposts, in Ceylon and Batavia (at the 
site of the Indonesian city of Jakarta), counted less than 3,000 Europeans each by the end 
of the seventeenth century.27 Because of the small numbers, the shortage of European 
women, the desire or need to establish and strengthen networks with native elites, and—
compared to the situation in the Americas—the more equal relationship between the 
indigenous people and Europeans in Asia, relations between the two groups were 
frequent and intense, including many “mixed” marriages. Such a background was no 
social disadvantage. Children of mixed marriages did not encounter any discrimination in 
Batavia’s urban society life.28 
   At the same time, it is important to repeat that although the Dutch trade with Asia was 
spectacular in the views of past and present observers, the trade balance was almost 
always negative because the people living in Asia were barely interested in goods from 
Europe. In the seventeenth-century, inter-Asian or Asian country trade was actually more 
important and more profitable for the VOC than the import of Asian goods into Europe, 
according to P. W. Klein.29 This famous economic historian has argued that long-distance 
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trade with Europe before the second half of the nineteenth century was too insignificant 
for the integration into the world market of the East Asian economy. Only then, 
Western—not Dutch—“technology, shipping and communication had developed 
sufficiently for establishing an indissoluble direct bond between the world market” and 
China and Japan.30 
   As pointed out earlier, due to the political, economic, and religious circumstances in 
Early Modern Europe, migration was an important aspect of the Dutch Golden Age. In 
their book on the history of immigration into the Netherlands, Lucassen and Penninx 
distinguish four categories of immigrants.31 The first category consists of those who were 
forced to leave their country because of religious and/or political changes. These 
migrants often came in groups and within a short period of time. In general, this category 
of immigrants has attracted more attention than the other three categories. Within this 
category, the first and biggest group was formed by the approximately 100,000 
immigrants from the Southern Netherlands (present day Belgium, Luxemburg, and the 
French departments Nord and Pas-de-Calais). Because of the political, religious, and 
economic consequences of the Spanish Reconquest in the last quarter of the sixteenth 
century, many left for England and the Protestant German states, but the majority came to 
the Northern provinces. It is important to keep in mind that, despite some cultural 
differences (for instance, language), the arrival of these newcomers did not result in 
ethnic or ethnological diversity. And because of their education, skills, contacts, and 
wealth, many made a valuable contribution to the economic, scientific, and cultural 
bloom of the Republic. In the eyes of a Haarlem or Gouda citizen, probably most of the 
Flemish newcomers were no more different than someone from the northern province of 
Groningen or from Maastricht in the South. 
   The second biggest migration wave was formed by French Protestants, Huguenots, who 
fled France during the last two decades of the seventeenth century because of the 
persecution after the revocation in 1685 of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV. Out of a 
total of 200,000 refugees, an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 Huguenots settled in the 
Netherlands. Initially they were welcomed and even actively invited by individual cities. 
Among the first Huguenots there were many specialized traders and skilled craftsmen so 
Dutch town governments were eager to attract these fellow-citizens and Protestant 
brothers. They offered free citizenship and temporary fiscal and other advantages. 
However, poorer Huguenots, who arrived later, did not meet with the same hospitality 
and generosity.32 The influx of tens of thousands of Huguenots did not create ethnic 
diversity either, but they made a much appreciated and much sought after contribution to 
Dutch economic and cultural life. 
   Jewish refugees formed another, much smaller group of immigrants. In the first decades 
of the seventeenth century a few thousand Portuguese Jews arrived in the Dutch 
Republic, in particular in Amsterdam. Almost all of them were officially Roman 
Catholics. Because of their Jewish roots, however, the Inquisition in Portugal (united 
with Spain at that time) persecuted these conversos. The Inquisition did not want to 
believe that these new Christians were true Christians. After their escape to the 
Netherlands many preferred to reconvert to the Jewish religion. Many of these 
Portuguese or Sephardic Jews were rich and well educated. Because of their economic 
position and connections, Amsterdam in particular (and a few other cities) welcomed 
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Sephardic Jews, sometimes officially presenting them as Christians to make them more 
acceptable to the local population.33 
   Between 1635 and 1750, some 10,000 Jews from Central and Eastern Europe sought 
refuge in the Netherlands, trying to escape from bloody persecutions, pogroms, and anti-
Semitism. Compared to the Portuguese Jews, these immigrants were very poor. As a rule, 
Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews did not mingle or mix. The influx of the poor, unwelcome 
Ashkenazi Jews in some way re-marginalized the Jews within Dutch society, 
notwithstanding the fact that “the degree of their acceptance and absorption was still a 
unique success in the otherwise miserable history of the Jews and gentiles in early 
modern Europe.”34 
   The official and public Dutch response to both groups of Jewish newcomers was very 
different than the attitude shown toward the Protestant refugees from the Southern 
Netherlands and France. As indicated above, the latter were often welcomed because in 
general they were seen as culturally alike and economically valuable, while the former 
were converted Roman Catholics or Jews. In addition to this religious and/or ethnic 
difference, the poverty of most of the Ashkenazi was also seen as problematic. A few 
cities were willing to grant citizenship to those Jewish immigrants who could afford it 
financially. However, even Jews with citizenship were almost always excluded from the 
guilds.35 A number of edicts also banned foreign and poor German and Eastern European 
Jews from certain towns and provinces. 
   Many more small groups of Protestant religious dissenters and refugees from all over 
Europe found a new home in the Dutch Republic, where they could enjoy a 
comparatively high degree of religious freedom. 
   The second category of (temporary) immigrants was formed by those who had to be in 
the Netherlands for a certain period of time because of the nature of their economic 
activities. These people were “passers-by,” predominantly engaged in trade and 
manufacturing.  
   The third category consisted of those who traditionally worked as temporary migrant 
labor, following the cycle of seasons. Seasonal work was often in agriculture and many 
seasonal workers came from German states. 
   The many tens of thousands of individuals and families who migrated to the 
Republic—in particular to the Western provinces—were attracted by the better economic 
opportunities and relative prosperity. They made up the fourth and last category. In 
general, the temporary or permanent presence of the last three categories of newcomers 
did not cause major problems because they were not different, from a cultural and 
ethnological point of view. Simon Schama rightly emphasizes the importance of 
settlement and the desire of migrants to settle, to become an “insider,” in his 
terminology.36 The Dutch citizens regarded vagrants or vagabonds as a menace to the 
civic and moral order. Vagrants and gypsies were banned, imprisoned, or sent to houses 
of correction. 
   It is important to keep in mind that although immigration was considerable, the 
estimated percentage of inhabitants of the Republic born abroad never exceeded ten 
percent. In 1550, it was less than two percent. It increased to nine percent in 1600, was 
eight percent in 1650, and dropped to five percent in 1700. During the eighteenth century, 
immigration numbers fell drastically due to the worsening economic and social situation, 
as well as a growing inhospitality. In 1900, the percentage was equal to that of 1550. 
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Furthermore, overseas emigration numbers were rather insignificant compared to 
immigration numbers. 
   Calvinism, religious heterogeneity, and tolerance of other religions are time and again 
mentioned in relation to the Dutch Golden Age. At the end of the sixteenth century, the 
Calvinist Protestants were but a small minority in the Netherlands. Many more 
inhabitants belonged to other Protestant groups (including Mennonites and Lutherans), 
while Catholics made up about one-third of the total population of the young Republic. A 
century later, the percentage of Calvinists had increased at the cost of other, often more 
moderate Protestant groups, although the Calvinists never formed a majority. The change 
of the religious landscape was to a considerable extent the result of what Henk van 
Nierop has described as a deliberate policy of “confessional cleansing” by city 
governments, especially during the first years of the revolt against Spain.37 The treaty of 
the Union of Utrecht granted individual freedom of conscience in religious matters, but 
not the freedom to actively practice, for instance, Catholicism. An important distinction 
was made between individual and collective, and between private and public. Catholics 
formed about 30 percent of the population of the towns in the province of Holland and 
more than 40 percent of the population of the Republic as a whole. The strong presence 
of non-Protestants in the United Provinces calls for a re-evaluation of Wallerstein’s 
statement that Protestantism was bound to become (and became) the religion of the 
center-states of the modern world-system.38 
   Calvinism was not a true state religion and the Calvinist, or Reformed Church, was not 
a true state church either. While the regents did agree that the Reformed Church 
embodied the one and only true religion, they did not accept claims that this church 
should have any formal influence on policies and politics. In the words of Henk van 
Nierop: even “champions of tolerance as Erasmus, Cornelis Pietersz Hooft, merchant and 
burgomaster of Amsterdam, and even the maverick Dirck Volkertsz Coornhert ultimately 
strove for religious concord, not diversity. If tolerance of the unorthodox was acceptable 
as a temporary expedient under certain conditions, it was not a goal to be striven for.”39 
Furthermore, recent studies have strongly underscored the limits of toleration. They have 
warned against seeing this limited and pragmatic religious tolerance as an early policy 
example or a first step toward the modern separation between church and state.40 
Especially in the urban, local-lead societies with important trading interests and the 
presence of sizeable religious minorities, a certain degree of tolerance, and a certain 
degree of separation between church and state, made sense.41 
   Notwithstanding the fact that Catholics were excluded from city government and 
officially could not practice their religion, they were never limited in their civic rights. 
They had good reason to trust the protection of the rule of law, something that cannot be 
said of religious dissenters living in other seventeenth-century countries, where, as in 
France and England, religious diversity had led to civil war. For some groups within 
Dutch society, however, the rule of law could be rather severe. For example, sexual 
intercourse between Jewish men and Christian women could and often did lead to 
corporal punishment. 
   What is more, tolerance for sexual deviance was definitely not a characteristic of the 
Dutch Golden Age. In this respect, Voltaire, in his Dictionnaire philosophique portative, 
first published in London and Geneva in 1764, wrote under “love, the so-called Socratic” 
that it was well known that this “error of nature” is much more common in mild climates 
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than in the frosty cold of the North. According to Voltaire, what is seen as a weakness in 
Southern Europe is a “repulsive horror” in the eyes of the Dutch sailor and the Russian 
market-woman.42 Indeed, homosexuality was not tolerated at all in the Republic. On the 
contrary, many male homosexuals were persecuted and executed, often in a particular 
painful and dishonorable way and after having been tortured. The death penalty for this 
“unnatural vice” and “horrible crime” was commonly believed to be right and necessary 
in order to stop the corruption of society and to avert God’s anger and punishment.43 
 
***** 
 
Although the paintings of Vermeer, Rembrandt, Hals, and Steen may not immediately 
spring to mind when discussing the Dutch contribution to globalization, they are an 
integral feature of the Dutch Golden Age and perhaps also its most popular and well-
documented aspect. In the eyes of John Merriman, Dutch paintings of the Golden Age 
reflect “not only its precocious commercial wealth, but also its toleration and openness to 
secular styles and subject matter.”44 Mariët Westermann, Director of the Institute of Fine 
Arts of New York University, singles out the unprecedented concern for a “reality 
effect,” the lifelikeness and realism of the pictures. Many pictures were not “real” or 
“true” in the sense of a faithful reconstruction or honest depiction of reality. They suggest 
reality, what they want to show is a technically very accomplished but artificial reality, 
“offering meaning” through a positive or negative articulation of certain social ideals.45 
According to Westermann, Dutch artists were more concerned with this verisimilitude 
than their colleagues in “almost any other western culture.”46 However, in comparison, 
Dutch seventeenth-century pictures are less idealized and more truthful and realistic. 
   The existence of an open art market, dominated by the taste and demand of private, 
middle-class citizens—instead of being dependent on commissions from courts and 
churches—was also rather special. Painting as a trade in the Republic resembled a 
modern industry, with specialization in the production of certain genres of pictures. 
Knowing the preference for certain themes can add to our understanding of the Dutch 
Republic and its inhabitants. Westermann, for example, mentions landscapes, cityscapes, 
animal paintings, still lifes, paintings of everyday life, and portraits as popular genres. 
Many pictures show economic activities, markets, ships, fleets, harbors, naval battles, and 
seascapes. Marine painters were highly rewarded. 
   Dutch seventeenth-century pictures “show little of colonial working life, concentrating 
rather on colonial benefits to trade, art and science.”47 In the arts such a difference 
between the Dutch views of Asia and of the Americas and Africa is visible. Paintings of 
Dutch Brazil, for example, “mark the indigenous scene as Dutch indeed, easily and 
rightfully accessible to Dutch cultivation…Dutch portrayal of the indigenous peoples was 
structured as much by received opinion as by observation.”48 These peoples were 
depicted as primitive and sometimes as cannibals. Pictures of Asia showed the exotic, 
seldom the barbaric. 
   Much has been written about the moral economy of the Dutch in general and about the 
moral meanings and messages of Dutch paintings. Simon Schama is not the only one who 
emphasized the tension between enjoying success and celebrating prosperity and 
enterprise, and the fear of the moral consequences of riches and the obsessive recognition 
of God’s benevolence. Still lifes and many other pictures can indeed also be “read” as 
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warnings and moral lessons, but I would like to counsel against seeing all paintings as 
full of hidden messages. Neither can we assume that every Dutch citizen saw and 
understood those messages in the same way. And many pictures in the popular genre of 
banquets and good food had no visible or covert warning. 
 
***** 
 
One of the main debates concerning the Dutch Golden Age focuses on the question of 
how modern its society and culture were (“modern” often being equated with “positive”). 
As we have seen, economists and economic historians have heralded the (relatively) 
modern economy of the Republic. Others, like the British historians Lesley Price and 
Simon Schama, have emphasized its modern social structure, a predominantly middle-
class urban society in a century in which estates characterized the social order in most 
other countries in Europe. Dutch cultural historians Willem Frijhoff and Marijke Spies 
have highlighted the modern culture of debate.49 In his controversial Enlightenment 
Contested: Philosophy, Modernity and the Emancipation of Man 1670–1752, Jonathan 
Israel traced the roots of modernity through the Enlightenment to the late seventeenth 
century Republic, with its radical thinkers like Spinoza (who, by the way, was barely 
tolerated in the Republic) and culture of debate.50 
   The only non-modern element seems to be politics. At least until the middle of the 
twentieth century, most authors were quite negative about the rather medieval, 
decentralized political system of the Republic, in which division, particularism, 
compromise, and slow decision-making were standard. According to nineteenth-century 
historians and political scientists, the odd and old-fashioned political system of the 
Republic had no future. They assigned much of the blame to this particular polity for the 
fact that the Dutch Republic in the eighteenth century was superseded by “modern” 
states. Still, this political system worked rather well in the seventeenth century. 
Especially the old fashioned primacy of local and regional government helps to explain 
why Dutch citizens had more trust in their governments, which was favorable for 
innovation and investment.51 It may also be a reference point for the future organization 
of a globalized world, in which cities are back, as some authors like Jean Gelman Taylor 
claim.52 The seventeenth and eighteenth century Dutch city network may offer an 
alternative to territorial or national state political economy. In this respect, it is important 
to note the substantial difference between Wallerstein’s image of strong, centralized 
states within the modern world-system of the long sixteenth century and the actual 
political organization of the United Provinces. 
 
II.  Legacy and Heritage 
 
I would like to briefly address the collective image of the Dutch Golden Age: how we 
like to present the seventeenth-century Republic to others and how we want the Golden 
Age to be seen and known. 
   Johan Huizinga, probably the most famous Dutch historian, preferred to characterize 
the Dutch seventeenth century as an age of wood and iron, pitch and tar, and courage and 
energy, rather than using its later, eighteenth-century designation of Golden Age.53 
Huizinga still believed, however, that the Dutch civilization of the seventeenth century 
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was unique, an exception to the common European civilization, because of its distinct 
burgerlijk character (which unfortunately was gradually lost in the late seventeenth 
century and the first decades of the eighteenth century). 
   In espousing this view, Huizinga follows in a long tradition, beginning in the mid-
eighteenth century, of Dutch moralists who sought to understand the relative decline of 
the Republic, as well as to find ways of reviving its success. One of their basic 
assumptions was the partly mythical idea of the seventeenth-century Republic’s social 
and cultural homogeneity, of citizens and regents sharing basic values, having similar 
lifestyles, and belonging to one and the same social and cultural “middle class” or 
“bourgeois” universe. In this persistent view an important role is played by the attributed 
and exaggerated cultural alteration or “aristocratization” of the wealthy elites, who 
became more “French” and less “Dutch.” These elites seemed eager to weaken their ties 
with and to distance themselves from the common people, the honest and simple folks 
who were believed to have preserved the “old Dutch” values, habits, customs, and social 
manners. What the eighteenth-century Republic needed was a revival of the old norms 
and values—a return of traditional, honest, and freedom-loving republican leadership of 
active and thrifty merchants and manufacturers. Here we see some reminiscences of 
Simon Schama’s Embarrassment of Riches and Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism, which stressed the elements of self-control and of saving and 
investing money in new and profitable activities instead of spending it on conspicuous 
consumption.54 
   This still popular view is based on a primarily moral explanation of the process of a 
Golden Age turning into a “Silver” one, ignoring structural economic and political factors 
and developments. Although this image still betrays much exaggeration and idealization, 
it proved to be a powerful political weapon in the hands of the so-called Patriots at the 
end of the eighteenth century, criticizing the stadtholder and his supporters among the 
regents.55 With respect to the legacy issue it is interesting to observe that this first group 
of “inventors” of the special Dutch Golden Age character failed to mention issues 
associated with tolerance and diversity! 
   Finally, I will focus on the legacy of the Dutch Golden Age and its role in the United 
States, before drawing some general conclusions. In 2009, much attention was given to 
the celebration of 400 years of Dutch-American relations, which started in 1609 when a 
small expedition of the Dutch East India Company, captained by the Englishman Henry 
Hudson, arrived at Manhattan. The Dutch government considered this celebration an 
opportunity to further strengthen the economic bonds between the two countries. The city 
of Amsterdam, branding and marketing itself as the “Gay Capital of the World,” 
emphasized its special role and mission, which was “continuing its commitment to 
openness and tolerance.” It sent its deputy mayor, Carolien Gehrels, who issued a 
statement in support of equality and tolerance for the gay community and who 
participated in New York Gay Pride Parade.56 Moreover, during his visit to New York, 
Amsterdam Mayor Job Cohen joined in marriage five American-Dutch same-sex couples 
brought in by the city of Amsterdam for the occasion. 
   At the same time, Joep de Koning, a very active Dutch New Yorker, tried in vain to get 
official support for his Tolerance Park project on Governors Island. This park was meant 
to appeal to the imagination of Americans in the same manner as such popular re-
creations as Jamestown and New Plymouth, serving as permanent sites of Anglo-
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American cultural heritage. As the park’s projected central theme, De Koning envisioned 
the continuing cultural consequences of the Dutch settlement of New York for 
contemporary America. He claimed that its “unique historical contribution” is to be found 
in the instruction given to the colonists in 1624, reiterating one of the founding treaties of 
the Republic, the Union of Utrecht of 1579. In his view, it specifically refers to “religious 
tolerance as the basis of ethnological diversity in the American culture of freedom (then, 
now and in the future).”57 These examples reveal active efforts to promote tolerance—in 
different fields and meanings—as the Dutch Golden Age’s legacy to the world. 
   Two years before the 2009 celebration, the city of Leiden officially celebrated the 
historical fact that in 1607 the British Pilgrim Fathers, coming from Plymouth, sailed to 
the “promised land,” after staying several years in exile in Leiden. They landed near Cape 
Cod and built a new Plymouth. The Lakenhal, one of Leiden’s museums, showed an 
interesting exhibition called “Holland Mania: American and Japanese Views of the 
Netherlands.” Japan was included because in 2007 the Dutch also celebrated 400 years of 
trade relations with Japan. In the introduction of a book published on the occasion of the 
exhibition and bearing the same title, the director of the Lakenhal argues that the Pilgrim 
Fathers did more than just start a settlement: they “laid the foundation of the values and 
mores of the United States: honour and loyalty to home and family, the Protestant work 
ethics, respect for nature and for the principles of democracy.”58 Elsewhere in this study, 
it is indicated that in the nineteenth century the pious, heroic, and hard-working Pilgrim 
Fathers were even presented as role models for later waves of immigrants from Southern 
and Eastern Europe.59 The Pilgrim Fathers tend to be considered as representative of the 
Dutch Republic and its values. They came to Leiden because they were welcome in 
Holland, where they “belonged,” but were they actually more Dutch than British, if not 
typically Dutch? 
   In Holland Mania, several authors describe and analyze what Americans have 
considered to be typically Dutch characteristics: freedom, entrepreneurship, the struggle 
against the sea, cleanliness, and domesticity. Entrepreneurship was and is often equated 
with the so-called “VOC mentality.” In recent years, the former Dutch Prime Minister 
Jan Peter Balkenende, echoing voices of the past, has used this expression several times 
in his speeches and political analysis to indicate what, in his view, the current Dutch 
people should hark back to as a source of inspiration. This reference to the Dutch past has 
met with severe criticism because, as his opponents argued, it is uncalled for to hold up 
the example of a company that made fortunes for its stockholders by exploiting the native 
peoples of Indonesia and other regions. 
   Holland “mania” is said to have existed in the U.S. ever since the middle of the 
nineteenth century. In my view, it largely amounted to a sentimental celebration and 
glorification of everything “Old Dutch” or all that could pass as such. At that time, it 
seems, many Americans were convinced that American democracy was firmly rooted in 
the form of government first established by the Dutch Republic. Moreover, the American 
ideal of liberty also involved a legacy of the Dutch, who, after all, had liberated 
themselves from an oppressive monarchy, much in the same way the Americans would 
do 200 years later.60 In this same vein, such late nineteenth-century American historians 
as Henry Morton Dexter and William Elliott Griffis argued that typical Dutch Golden 
Age values like religious tolerance, a free press, local self-government, free education, 
and a written constitution had been decisive for the development of the United States.61 
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They were certainly wrong with respect to free education and a written constitution, 
which did not exist in the Dutch Republic. Nor were religious tolerance and freedom of 
press absolute or comprehensive; there was some, but within certain limits and motivated 
at best by pragmatism and business sense, rather than by principles and ideology. 
   I will close this short and quite preliminary survey of authors writing on the Dutch 
Golden Age legacy and heritage with Russell Shorto, one of the advisors of the Dutch 
Government with respect to the celebrations of 2009. According to The New York Times, 
his bestselling and highly praised The Island at the Center of the World: The Epic Story 
of Dutch Manhattan and The Forgotten Colony that Shaped America “will permanently 
alter the way we regard our collective past.” In the last chapter, “Inherited Features,” 
Shorto mentions the creation of a society with more open spaces, in which “the rungs of 
the ladder were reachable by nearly everyone,” a state policy of tolerance being the 
essence of the “mixing-of-cultures idea.”62 The text on the cover even goes one step 
further: “The Dutch Colony was multi-ethnic, and its citizens valued free trade, 
individual rights, and religious liberty. Their champion was a progressive young lawyer 
named Adriaen van der Donck, who emerges in these pages as a forgotten American 
patriot….” 
   My argument here was meant to underscore that many elements of the various Dutch 
Golden Age legacies to the modern world have rightly been contested by historians. It is 
anachronistic and historically incorrect to present the seventeenth-century Dutch as 
modern, capitalist, multi-ethnic, and principled believers in (and advocates of) religious 
and sexual freedom and tolerance. The seventeenth-century Dutch republic was a unique 
mixture of old and new.63 The “modern” picture starts from the concept of “heritage,” a 
version of the past based on present needs and ideals and regarded as useful for future 
use. It is a selective and fabricated version of the past, a past as it should have been, 
providing cultural standards for today and tomorrow. Heritage is dynamic and linked up 
with identity by definition. No version or interpretation of the past is absolute, or can last 
forever.64 It should be added, though, that contemporary images and identities often differ 
from each other just as much as historical ones did. If and to what extent the twenty-first 
century Dutch citizens and Dutch society can be described as modern, open, inclusive, 
cosmopolitan, tolerant, and freedom-loving is a topic for another conversation. 
   Of course, it is rather easy to contest the principled, comprehensive, and modern 
character of Dutch Golden Age tolerance and freedom, and the existence of a true world 
economy made by capitalist, internationally oriented merchants. Similarly, it is not 
difficult to contest its uniqueness for the seventeenth century or for the Republic. But in a 
relative, comparative sense, the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic was special because 
of some of its particular values, including protection of the rights of the individual, the 
influential voice of its citizens, pragmatic tolerance toward other religions in an age of 
religious hatred and civil war, and a political system and culture based on consultation, 
persuasion, compromise, and trust. The common well-being and prosperity were 
principal goals, instead of personal glory or the dynastic interests of kings and princes. 
From this more modest, more historical perspective, the Dutch Republic certainly had 
something to offer to the modern world-system, one that Dutch merchants, 
manufacturers, regents, sailors, soldiers, and scientists all helped to develop. 
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